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REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE PARTIES UNDER
RULE 106-5
Rule 106-5, 1
 promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,2
 was designed primarily to protect buyers and sellers of securities
on security exchanges from fraud. Originally viewed as a preventive measure
to allow the Securities Exchange Commission to police fraudulent activities
in the purchase or sale of securities on exchanges, the Rule has grown mainly
through the exercise of private actions. 3
 The initial problem, whether any
civil action would be allowed under 10b-5, was resolved in the affirmative
early in the history of the Rule.4
 A major persisting problem, however, is the
nature of the remedies available to private litigants under 10b-5, for the Rule
provides no explicit remedies. 5
Because of the variety of conduct proscribed by the Rule and because
of the corresponding need for varying remedies, it is important to outline the
general scope of the remedies and the basic kinds of relief available to plain-
tiffs who are successful in 10b-5 actions. Then an analysis of the development
of those remedies and their application to various factual situations can be
undertaken.
I. REMEDIES IN GENERAL
The scope of available remedies under 10b-5 is governed by two Supreme
Court cases decided under the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. 6 In Deckert
v. Independence Shares Corp.,7
 the Supreme Court noted that the federal courts
had been given the power to enforce the Securities Act of 1933 and stated
further:
The power to enforce implies the power to make effective the right
of recovery afforded by the Act. And the power to make the right of
recovery effective implies the power to utilize any of the procedures
or actions normally available to the litigant according to the exigen-
cies of the particular case. 8
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
3
 See A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud—SEC Rule 10b-5 § 2.2 (1968).
4 See ICardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED. Pa. 1946) ; A. Brom-
berg, supra note 3, § 2.4(1).
5
 Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78 (1964).
7
 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
8
 Id. at 288.
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This case gives the federal courts a wide area of discretion in providing
remedies under the Securities Acts. The second case, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,9
concerned itself with preemption by the Securities Acts of the states' corpora-
tion laws. The Court in effect made any state's corporation law inapplicable
in certain situations involving securities when it said:
[W]e believe that the overriding federal law applicable here [the
• Act of 1934] would, where the facts required, control the appropriate-
ness of redress despite the provisions of state corporation law, for
it "is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where
federal rights are concerned." 10
With this mandate, the federal courts have proceeded to develop their own
remedies for 10b-5 violations to meet the exigencies of each case.
One important limitation on the redress available under the Rule is
embodied in Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act. 11 That provision limits damages
to "actual damages." The courts have consistently interpreted this provision
to disallow any punitive damages under 10b-5. 12 One of the major purposes
of this comment is to determine what the federal courts have considered
"actual damages" to mean and to deduce what actual damages should mean
in 10b-5 cases.
Within this broad framework for possible remedies under the Rule,
courts have generally granted three kinds of relief. The three basic remedies
employed by the courts in 10b-5 actions are money damages, recission of
the transaction and restitution of the consideration given by the plaintiff,
and the injunction.
Money damages to compensate a plaintiff for his actual damages as
required by section 28(a) are generally measured by the federal out-of-pocket
rule of damages.13 Under that rule, the plaintiff is granted money damages
in an amount equal to the difference between the value of the security at the
date of purchase or sale and the price paid or received on that date. The
federal out-of-pocket rule is difficult to use in practice, for it requires the
9 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
10 Id, at 434 (citation omitted).
11 Section 28(a) provides in part:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and
all rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person per-
mitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall
recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount
in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of. . . .
15 U.S.C. § 7Sbb(a) (1958).
12 Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345, 364 (D.N.f. 1966), rev'd on other gounds,
393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469
(SDN.Y. 1963) (motion to strike granted as the claim for punitive damages in a 10b-5
action was impertinent). Cf. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 197
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (recovery of punitive damages upheld although the jury did not dis-
tinguish whether liability was based on Rule 10b-5 or § 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933).
13 Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303
F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962); see C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages
§ 121 (1935).
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determination of actual value of the security at the time of purchase or sale
to permit measurement of damages. 14
In situations where the security is not widely traded, the courts are
faced with a difficult problem in determining actual value for there may be
no indicia of value other than intrinsic factors." In many instances, these
intrinsic factors defy precise measurement. Even if the security is widely
traded, the determination of actual value at the time of the sale may be
difficult because the speculation inherent in most security purchases or sales
takes place in a mass market situation where heavy volume and rapid turnover
prevail. If the 10b-5 violation results in manipulation of the market price,
plaintiff's selling or purchase price may not be equal to actual value. Thus, a
court may have to distinguish to what extent the 10b-5 violation distorts
market price as opposed to the effect of other economic factors in order to
determine actual' value. Moreover, many plaintiffs may buy or sell during the
10b-5 violation at different market prices and thus cause problems of con-
solidated suits."
The second basic remedy for plaintiffs deceived in a violation of 10b-5,
rescission of the transaction and restitution to the plaintiff of the shares sold
or the money paid for the security, is grounded in Section 29 17 of the 1934
Act which makes all contracts in violation of the Act voidable. Recission and
return of the securities to the seller may create important problems. For
example, the defendant may entirely lose his ownership rights even though
the plaintiff was willing to sell his securities if the price had been equitable.
Restitution at a time many years after the fraudulent transaction may also
include speculative damages because of an increase in the value of the security
as a result of favorable economic factors unforeseeable when the fraud
occurred. Rescission and restitution may also limit the recovery of a plaintiff-
buyer to the price paid for the security plus interest, for an inference may
arise that he would not have bought the security at all if the true facts had
been known to him.
The third remedy, injunctions by private parties, is invoked generally
in derivative actions where the plaintiff is trying to prevent the initiation or
continuation of some corporate activity. Derivative suits cause special prob-
lems for the application of money damages or recission and restitution after
the transaction has been completed, for the transaction may cause a change
of ownership or a change of corporate structure involving changes in business
policy. Consequently the task of determining actual damages and applying
the appropriate remedy becomes extremely complex in many derivative actions.
This comment will first examine the remedies available to buyers and
sellers bringing an action to redress their injuries as a result of a 10b-5 viola-
14 The term actual value is analogous to the terms real or fair value often used by
the courts. "Market value" for purposes of this comment signifies the price of a widely
traded security as determined by buyers and sellers in the market place.
15 Generally, intrinsic factors are those that determine the present worth of the
issuing company and its potential for future growth. Cf. 1 J. Bonbright, Valuation of
Property 24-29 (1937). For further discussion, see pp. 340-41 infra.
18 But see Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968).
ir 15 U.S.C. § 7Scc(b) (1964).
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tion. Second, it will discuss the remedies available in actions by plaintiffs suing
derivatively for the benefit of their corporation. This distinction is predicated
upon the differences in relief sought by the parties in each case and upon
the different considerations which determine the appropriateness of relief
generally.
II. REMEDIES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL SELLER OR BUYER
A. Remedies for Plaintiff-Sellers
The courts have reached the damages question in 10b-5 actions most
often in actions by plaintiff-sellers. This result is to be expected in light of
the many other provisions of the Securities Acts which protect buyers from
fraud. 18
1. Money Damages.—Money damages are awarded to a plaintiff-seller to
compensate him for the loss which he incurs by selling at a price below the
securities' actual value as a result of a 10b-5 violation. In applying the federal
out-of-pocket rule of damages, the courts have continually confronted a
need to determine the "actual value" of the security. Because it is so difficult
to determine actual value, the cases are inconsistent and the measure of
damages employed is often unrealistic.
a. The Intrinsic Method of Valuation. In situations where no resale
occurs and where the security is not widely traded, a major problem in
determining actual value arises, for the courts do not have any indicia of
value aside from intrinsic factors. In dicta, the court in Kohler v. Kohler Co.19
adopted the strict federal out-of-pocket rule where plaintiff was a seller. Al-
though the plaintiff suggested several methods for the court to use in valuing
the security the court held there had been no violation of 10b-5 and denied
recovery of any damage. Although the court apparently decided that there
was no deception as required by 10b-5, it noted that the plaintiff had not
established any resale or other valid criteria of valuation and found that
plaintiff could only prove actual value by an appraisal. Although the court
does not reject the intrinsic method of valuation, the case illustrates the
difficult burden which the plaintiff must bear to prove, by that method, actual
value on the date of sale.
Although the court in Kohler relies on earnings as the principal indicia
of value,2° other factors should be considered in the intrinsic method of
valuation. These factors would be similar to those used in valuation of secur-
ities for tax purposes: the corporation's book value, earning capacity, dividend
paying ability and intangible assets, the nature of the corporation's business,
the general economic outlook, the economic outlook for the specific industry,
18 E.g., § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (civil liabilities on account of false
registration statements), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964) ; § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933
(civil liabilities arising in connection with prospectuses and communications), 15 U.S.C.
§ 771 (1964) ; § 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 (fraudulent interstate transactions), 15
U.S.C. § 77q (1964).
19 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963),
20 208 F. Supp. at 826.
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the market value of securities of comparable firms in the industry and the
size of the block transferred 2 1
Proving actual value at the time of the transaction by the intrinsic
method puts a difficult burden on the plaintiff and the courts, for many of
the influencing factors are not subject to precise measurement and the weight
given each factor must vary with the valuation of different securities."
Admittedly, this method is far from being completely accurate since all the
factors are subject to error in their determination. However, a court should
allow the plaintiff to use the intrinsic method of valuation where the case
requires. The courts should recognize that precise, actual value cannot be
found by any valuation method and should allow a reasonable approximation
on the basis of expert testimony to suffice. The alternative is to deny recovery
altogether even though a 10b-5 violation has occurred. This denial would
seem to create greater injustice than would the risk of awarding plaintiffs
too much in some cases.
b. The Resale Value Test. In cases where there are other reliable indicia
of value, most courts have not required the plaintiff to establish actual value
at the date of sale by the intrinsic method, but have used other means to
arrive at a satisfactory approximation of actual value. For example, in Ross v.
Licht,23
 the court used what may be termed the resale value test to determine
actual value at the date of sale. In Ross, plaintiffs were induced by defen-
dants' fraud to sell their stock at a certain price, and two weeks later the
defendants resold the securities at a much higher price. The court held:
Absent market value (as here), "fair value is to be determined from
all the pertinent circumstances both for a reasonable time before the
sale and after it. * * * If there can be no exact calculation * * * the
wrongdoer cannot complain if a reasonable approximation is
reached."24
The court then found that the resale price two weeks later corresponded to
actual value at the time of sale and measured damages by the difference
between plaintiff's selling price and defendant's resale price.
The courts have employed various procedures to measure the resale value
of the securities in order to approximate actual value at the date of sale and
thereby adhere to the federal out-of-pocket rule. In Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co.,25
 the first case allowing 10b-5 to be used by private parties, the
court granted an accounting to plaintiffs, selling shareholders from whom
defendants had withheld the information that the assets were to be sold to
National Gypsum Company. Five days after the plaintiffs' sale, defendants
consummated the contract for the sale of the assets. The actual sale was com-
pleted approximately one year after plaintiffs' sale. The accounting was
21 See Rev, Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 237; Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (1958).
22 Comment, Determination of Related Parties: A Critical Discusssion of the Value
Test Prescribed in the Internal Revenue Code, 9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 171, 172-3
(1967).
23 263 F. Supp. 395, 411 (S.DN.Y. 1967).
24
 Id. at 410 (citation omitted).
25 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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granted to restore the plaintiffs to their "proportionate share of the profits" 26
of the asset sale. The only appropriate way to determine the plaintiffs' pro-
portionate share of the profits would be to consider the sale of the assets to be
a resale of the stock. Damages would then be measured by the difference
between the per share proceeds of the asset sale and the per share selling
price of plaintiffs multiplied by the number of shares sold by each plaintiff.
The proceeds per share when the assets were sold is equivalent to a resale
measure of actual value.
Similarly, in Speed v. Transamerica Corp.," the court employed the
liquidation value per share as resale value. In Speed, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants, by withholding information of an impending liquidation
and the increased value of the company's inventory, had induced them to
sell their shares at a price below the subsequent liquidation value. The court
employed the approach of a reasonable investor's activities if all the facts
had been known and reconstructed the liquidation of the corporation. 28
Damages were measured by what amounted to a resale value test, for the
plaintiffs were given damages measured by the difference between the per
share proceeds of the liquidation minus the plaintiffs' selling price per share
multiplied by the number of shares sold by each plaintiff."
These two ancillary procedures fix the actual value of the security by a
resale value test when the resale is in the form of a consolidation or liquida-
tion. Such ancillary procedures are essential to the proper measurement of
damages and should be employed whenever the circumstances require.
Use of the resale test is more complicated in situations where the security
is widely traded yet where market value does not reflect actual value. If, for
example, defendants engaged in fraudulent market manipulation that forced
market price downward, the courts would have to measure actual value by mar-
ket value before the manipulation began or sometime after it ceased. In the same
sense, if defendants were withholding material inside information and pur-
chasing the shares, then market value at a reasonable time after the informa-
tion became public would have to be utilized by the courts to measure
damages. Market value could not reflect actual value until the material in-
formation became known to buyers and sellers in the market place. In both
situations, actual value is measured by what market value would have been
at the time of the sale absent a lob-5 violation. This measure may be termed
equilibrium price." The determination of equilibrium price is not an easy
matter, for in many cases it is difficult to determine when the effects of the
10b-5 violation begin or when they cease to distort market price. In most
cases, therefore, the courts must settle for a reasonable approximation of
equilibrium price. In some cases defendant's resale in the open market will
20 Id. at 802.
27 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), enforcing 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd
with minor modifications, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
28 For a criticism of the court's approach to this liquidation see Comment, Corpora-
tions—Shareholders—Majority Liability for Improper Stock Redemption by Corporation
and for Misrepresentations in Private Stock Purchases From Minority Holders, 54 Mich.
L. Rev. 971 (1956).
29 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369,372 (3d Cir. 1956).
3 ° See 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1630 (2d ed. 1961).
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provide equilibrium price because, unless defendant's violation of the Rule
forced market price upwards, the defendant would not sell until the true facts
had come to light and the market price had adjusted to those facts.
c. Recovery of Speculative Damages. Aside from difficulties of ascertain-
ing when resale prices are not tainted by the defendant's fraud, two problems
arise in the use of the resale value test. First, it obviously cannot be applied
in cases where there is no resale. Second, if a resale occurs, it is difficult to
determine whether resale price reflects actual value at the time of plaintiff's
sale if the defendant does not resell until after a significant amount of time
has elapsed.
If a great deal of time elapses between plaintiff's sale and defendant's
resale, and if the court uses that resale price as actual value at the time of
plaintiff's sale, speculative damages unrelated to the 10b-5 violation may be
recovered. In the reasoning of Janigan v. Taylor, 31
 the resale measure of
actual value is distorted by a lapse of time, and the federal out-of-pocket rule
loses its identity. In Janigan plaintiffs had been induced by fraud to sell their
stock to the defendant in 1955 for $40,000, and the defendant resold the
stock two years later for $700,000 after he had managed the corporation for
the interim. Suit was brought in 1958. Having found a violation of Rule 10b-5,
the court implicitly rejected the out-of-pocket rule and the need to determine
actual value at the date of sale by holding
future accretions (sic) not foreseeable at the time of the transfer
even on the true facts, and hence speculative, are subject to another
factor, viz., that they accrued to the fraudulent party. It may, as in
the case at bar, be entirely speculative whether, had plaintiffs not
sold, the series of fortunate occurrences would have happened in
the same way, and to their same profit. However, there can be no
speculation but that the defendant actually made the profit, and,
once it is found that he acquired the property by fraud, that the
profit was the proximate consequence of the fraud, whether fore-
seeable or not. It is more appropriate to give the defrauded party
the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep
them. . . Mt is simple equity that a wrongdoer should disgorge his
fraudulent enrichment.32
It is submitted that this disgorgement of profits theory is inappropriate
to measure damages in 10b-5 actions. 33 By the court's admission in Janigan,
the disgorgement theory grants to the defendant speculative recovery—dam-
ages that do not result from defendant's 10b-5 violation. Such damages are
not actual damages as a result of a violation of 10b-5 nor are they even
benefit of the bargain damages. Recovery of speculative damages is based
on a quasi-unjust enrichment theory that becomes penal in nature. This
theory of recovery is contrary to section 28(a), which limits damages to
31 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
32 H. at 786.
33
 See 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1793 (2d ed. 1961).
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actual damages, and to the view that punitive or exemplary damages are not
recoverable in 10b-5 actions."
The resale value measure of damages should be used only when it pro-
duces a result consistent with the federal out-of-pocket rule. 35 Therefore,
when the resale occurs many years after plaintiff's sale, the resale price should
only be used to measure the actual value at the time of the IOb-5 violation in
rare circumstances if at all. The disgorgement theory of Janigan apparently
gives the plaintiff the benefit of an irrebuttable presumption that he would
not have sold during the time elapsed had he known the true facts. But the
mere fact that plaintiff sold the security to the defendant should indicate
that the plaintiff was willing to sell at an equitable price. In determining
damages, the courts should either require the plaintiff to prove that he would
not have sold the security during the time elapsed if the true facts had been
known to him, or at least allow defendant to prove that plaintiff would have
sold at an equitable price or at some time before defendant's resale. If it is
found that plaintiff would not have sold during the time elapsed, then the
actual value of the security to him at the date of sale is equal to defendant's
resale price, for the future accretions would have accrued to him had it not
been for the 10b-5 violation. If it is found that plaintiff would have sold the
security at an earlier time or that at a certain point the defendant's own
expertise caused the increase in value, the actual value at that point should
be used to determine damages. 36 This method may require the courts to use
the intrinsic method of valuation in situations where there is no accurate
market or resale price measure, but the problems involved in the intrinsic
method should not lead the courts to employ the disgorgement theory sug-
gested by Janigan.
d. Resale at a Loss. There is a second justification for employing the
resale measure of actual value in a manner consistent with the out-of-pocket
rule as suggested above. If by violation of 10b-5 defendant had induced
plaintiff to sell, the plaintiff should be allowed to show damage even if de-
fendant had resold at a loss. The loss suffered by defendant may be a result
of his mismanagement or of a sudden drop in the market. The application of
the resale value test in these situations deprives plaintiff of recovery of his
actual damages from the 10b-5 violation.
34 See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968) ; Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
35 But see Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 145 (D. Md. 1968).
36 Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968),
presents a close analogy to this suggested procedure. The court in Myzel would require
the defendant to disgorge future accretions only if the plaintiff can show that he would
had retained the stock if there had been full disclosure. 386 F.2d at 749. The court upheld
the district court's instruction that left to the jury the question of whether or not the
plaintiff would have sold. The district court had the benefit of defendant's resale five
years later, but instructed the jury that damages should be measured by the highest of
(1) the difference between selling price and the actual value of the security when sold, or
(2) the difference between selling price and the higher price at which plaintiff would
have sold if there had been complete disclosure or (3) the difference between selling
price and the value of the stock after a reasonable time, if the jury found that plaintiffs
would not have sold until that time if there had been complete disclosure. 386 F.2d at
744-45.
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2. Rescission and Restitution.—Once the recovery of speculative damages
is allowed by a disgorgement of profits theory, that theory can be applied to
allow restitution in cases where many years have elapsed from the time of
plaintiff's sale. The case of Baumel v. Rosen" provides an example of restitu-
tion based on reasoning like that which supports the recovery of speculative
profits combined with the traditional rationale for equitable restitution. Each
of the plaintiffs in Baumel was induced by- fraud to sell 500 shares of a com-
pany's stock for $10,000 in 1959. Some six years later the plaintiffs brought
an action for restitution. After holding that section 28(a) operates only to
prevent double recovery, the court noted that a defendant should disgorge
his fraudulent enrichment. The court proceeded to allow equitable restitu-
tion 38
 It reasoned:
[E]quity will act when the fixing of damages presents unusual
difficulties in their measurement, or where the uncertainty of correct
measurement will potentially result in great injustice to either of
the parties."
The court thereupon required the defendant to return the present equiv-
alent of 500 shares to each of the plaintiffs with the stipulation that plaintiffs
each return the $10,000 which they had received in 1959 plus interest. As a
result of events which occurred after the plaintiffs' sales, the present equivalent
of the 500 shares on the date of judgment, as found by the court, was 69,200
shares with a market value of approximately $563,000. Thus, each plaintiff,
in the court's estimation, was damaged by $563,000 (minus $10,000 plus
interest), and each plaintiff was returned to his position of substantial owner-
ship in a company of proven worth despite his earlier sale.
It is submitted that the Baumel decision reached a more inequitable
result by invoking equitable restitution than it would have reached had it
undertaken the "unusual difficulties" and "uncertainties" of measuring dam-
ages. Baumel, like Lanigan, gives plaintiff the benefit of an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that under the disgorgement theory he would not have sold during
the time elapsed. As discussed above, this disgorgement theory is inappropriate
in lOb-5 actions. Not only does restitution in effect give plaintiff extremely
speculative damages in cases like Baumel, but it deprives defendant of his
ownership rights in a company which he has apparently guided to success.
Although it may be argued that harsh results like those in Baumel serve as
deterrents to violations of 10b-5, some practical limitations on restitution
are necessary to prevent the recovery of speculative damages and to prevent
37 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968).
88 Baumel relies on avoidance of a contract induced by deceit as an equitable prin-
ciple. 283 F. Supp. 146. Other courts have relied on § 29(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 73cc(b), which voids the contract as a matter of law. E.g.,
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
Reliance on § 29 permits a court to grant restitutionary damages in an action at law
before a jury. Restitution is normally an equitable remedy, but restitution may be granted
in an action at law if the underlying contract is set aside as a matter of Iaw. See Myzel v.
Fields, supra.
39 Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 146 (D. Md. 1968).
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corporate upheavals through inordinate redistribution of corporate securities
at a point many years after a 10b-5 violation.
This view draws strength from the landmark case of SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulpher Co.4° In that case the Securities and Exchange Commission sought res-
titution on behalf of all sellers during a period when insiders purchased securi-
ties on the basis of inside information:II The Second Circuit not only established
a duty of insiders either to disclose any material inside information or to
refrain from buying, 42
 but also held that lack of due diligence of the corpora-
tion was sufficient to sustain an action for injunctive relief under 10b-5. 41
If these standards are applicable to actions by sellers in private actions, 44
then the recovery of speculative damages will be avoided only where the
10b-5 violation is discovered shortly after the transactions and the utmost
judicial expediency is used to reach a decision.
Even where the utmost expediency is employed, restitution should be
granted only where the transaction takes place on a face-to-face basis. In
situations where the security is widely traded, as in Texas Gulf, insiders
purchase only a limited number of shares while many thousands of other
sales may occur. Thus, no matter how quickly the action is brought, it would
be impossible to determine which sellers among all who sold during the period
of the lob-5 violation should receive .
 the limited number of shares available
for restitution. Privity cannot be considered a relevant test in market situations
since all trades are through intermediaries. Privity and other methods of deter-
mining which sellers should get restitution would leave the selection to pure
chance and might exclude some plaintiffs who were actually injured.
Conceivably, a court could grant restitution to those plaintiffs who can
prove that they relied on defendant's statements and prove also that they
would not have sold during the period had they known the true facts. If the
standard of proof of these facts is made too difficult, very few plaintiffs will
recover. If the standard of proof is made too easy, many plaintiffs will be
allowed recovery. In either case it is unlikely that the plaintiffs granted
restitution will match the number of shares available to be returned. The
alternative, that alI sellers during the period when defendants made purchases
in violation of 10b-5 receive shares, is improper and unrealistic because the
corporation would have to issue new shares.
In light of these factors, restitution is inappropriate in market situations
similar to Texas Gulf. 45
 Restitution should be available only in cases where
40
 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'g in part and aff'g in part 258 F. Supp. 262
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
41
 For a discussion of the propriety of this action by the SEC see Comment, Pri-
vate Remedies Available Under Rule 10b-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620, 629-31 (1966).
42 401 F.2d at 848.
43 Id. at 863.
44 But see id. at 864-69 (where some of the concurring justices voiced hesitation to
apply the rules set out in the decision to actions by private parties).
45 The only feasible remedy in cases like Texas Gulf, if the courts are to allow all
sellers to recover, is a combination of money damages and shares. Even this solution,
however, could be used only if none of the plaintiffs could show that they would have
held the stock indefinitely if full disclosure had been made.
The submitted formulation for relief in situations like Texas Gulf is as follows:
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all the selling shareholders who relied on the 10b-5 violation are identifiable
and where the defendant retains the shares. This situation arises most com-
monly in tender offer situations.'"
It is submitted, therefore, that both money damages and restitution to
the seller should be governed by a reasonable out-of-pocket rule to value the
securities and to determine the damages or number of shares to be returned
to the seller. Although this rule would involve the intrinsic method of valua-
tion in situations where no resale occurs a reasonable time after plaintiff's
sale and a determination of equilibrium price in open market situations, this
task is not so difficult as to justify the alternative, the awarding of speculative
damages.
B. Remedies for the Plaintiff-Buyer
An initial distinction should be made with respect to buyers' remedies
under 10b-5. Two procedures are available to shareholders under Rule 10b-5.
One is a suit by a buyer who has been induced by fraud to purchase the
security and who seeks to redress his own injury. The second is a derivative
(1) Require restitution to a receiver of the shares still held by the insiders which were
purchased during the period.
(2) Require the payment of damages by insiders who have resold as measured by the
equilibrium price after the market adjusts to the announcement of the previously with-
held information minus the price which the insiders paid.
(3) Compute the remaining damages payable by the defendants as follows: Let E =
equilibrium price; let T = the total number of shares sold by all sellers during the period
of the violation; let M = the total amount received by all sellers as a result of all sales
during that period; let S = the total number of shares held by the receiver; let R = the
total amount of damages already paid to the receiver by those defendants who resold; let
P = market price on the date of the judgment. The total damages that would have to be
paid, if any, over and above the return of the shares and the damages already paid by
those who resold would be found by solving the following equation for X:
(TX E) — M = (S X P) R X
(4) To compute the number of securities which should be returned to each individual
seller: let N = number of shares sold by the individual seller during the period of the vio-
lation; let T = the total number of shares sold by all sellers during the period of the
violation; let S = the total number of shares held by the receiver. Each plaintiff would
receive a proportionate number of shares found by solving the following formula for Y:
Y	 ,=—X
S
(5) The remainder of each seller's total damage recovery, or the amount of money each
seller must tender back to the receiver to be entitled to restitution of shares, would be
determined by solving the following equation for Z. If Z is a positive figure, the indi-
vidual seller should receive additional damages in that amount. If Z is a negative figure,
the seller should return that amount to the receiver before he is entitled to restitution of
the shares. Let all the letters equal what they equalled in (3) and (4) above.
(E X N) — F = (P X Y) Z
(6) A method of apportioning fractional shares could be devised, or if an equitable means
cannot be agreed upon, the divided shares could be sold by the receiver and the proceeds
divided among all sellers who were entitled to fractional shares. All shares or money
remaining in the hands of the receiver after all sellers have received their damage award
should be returned to each defendant who tendered shares to the receiver in proportion to
his original outlay for securities bought during the period.
46 A tender offer is generally a public offer made to the shareholders of a corporation
which states that the offeror will pay a stipulated price for all shares tendered to him by
a certain date.
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action by a shareholder who has not been induced by fraud to purchase but
who seeks to redress any diminution of the value of his shares or to protect
his ownership rights because of a 10b-5 violation inducing the corporation
to buy or sell. This section is concerned only with the former. Derivative
suits, because of the special situations which they present, are dealt with
separately in the next section.
Unlike the plaintiff-seller, the plaintiff-buyer is protected by other
provisions of the Securities Acts, and these provisions may govern situations
that also could be considered violations of 10b-5. 47 Nevertheless, plaintiff-
buyers apparently have the same two basic remedies as plaintiff-sellers in
10b-5 actions: rescission and money damages.
1. Rescission.—Rescission for the buyer is a relatively straightforward rem-
edy because it does not raise the problem of speculative damages present in
the case of returning the securities to the seller. The plaintiff-buyer is merely
attempting to get his money back. Plaintiff-buyer would seek rescission
where future growth of the stock is unlikely after his purchase, or at any
time when market value is less than price paid. Recovery in a rescission action
would be the amount paid for the security plus interest and other expenses
attributable to defendant's fraud.48 Moreover, the plaintiff would have to
return the securities to the defendant. 4°
2. Money Damages.—The recovery of money damages (other than those
allowable under a rescission measure) is questionable, for few reported cases
have reached this question under 10b-5. 5° Their dearth is due to the extensive
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 which protect buyers induced by
fraud or misrepresentations in their purchase of a security. 5' In cases where
plaintiff has been induced to purchase by a violation of 10b-5 and where the
plaintiff later resells at a loss, the measure of damage might be the difference
between price paid and resale price. 52 However, if a long period of time
elapses between purchase and resale, the decline in market value may be
due to economic factors unrelated to the fraud. The court should, therefore,
47 Some of these sections have already been listed. See note 18 supra. For discussion
of how some of these sections interrelate with Rule 10b-5, see Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (§§ 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l (1964)); Montague v. Electronic Corp., 76 F. Supp. 933, 936
(S.D.N.Y. 1948) (§ 11 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964)).
48 A. Bromberg, supra note 3, § 9.1. Cf. Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125, 129-30 (1889).
42 See Parker v. Baltimore Paint and Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 267, 270 (D. Colo.
1965).
BO The question was reached in Esplin v. Hirschi, Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
92,276 (10th Cir. Sept. 30, 1968). It is submitted, however, that the court in Esplin
made a technical error in the time which it used to measure damages. See pp. 349-50 and
note 54 infra.
51 See notes 18 and 47 supra.
52 A similar measure is provided for in § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(e) (1964):
The suit . . . may be to recover such damages as shall represent the difference
between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the
security was offered to the public) and . (2) the price at which such security
shall have been disposed of in the market before suit....
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adopt an equilibrium price or the intrinsic method of valuation in order to
give effect to the out-of-pocket rule where the circumstances of the case
require.
a. Unrealized Gains. In situations where the plaintiff has not resold
and does not desire rescission, the correct application of the federal out-of-
pocket rule is important. The courts have continually refused to grant plaintiff-
buyers expected but. unrealized gains.53 Expected but unrealized gains are
gains which the plaintiff expected in the security because of the facts repre-
sented to him by the defendant. In other words, the plaintiff is attempting
to recover damage as measured by the difference between the price paid and
the hypothetical value of the security at some future time if the facts given
him by defendant had been true. Thus, plaintiff attempts to prove what the
value should have been at some time after his purchase if the facts given him
by the defendant had been true. The possibility of future gain in value is specu-
lative and, therefore, should be excluded by the out-of-pocket rule. The proper
application of the federal out-of-pocket rule does not include expected but
unrealized gains. The measure of damages under the out-of-pocket rule is
the difference between price paid and actual value at the time of plaintiff's
purchase. The crux of the difference is that in expected but unrealized gains
the plaintiff is trying to recover on the •basis of expected value, not on the
basis of actual value as required by the - federal out-of-pocket rule. Thus, for
plaintiff to recover under the federal out-of-pocket rule, actual value must
be less than the price paid. This rule excludes the recovery of expected but
unrealized gains which the courts have rightfully rejected as entirely specu-
lative.
b. Increase in Value Despite Fraud. The courts must distinguish the
proper application of the federal out-of-pocket rule from expected but un-
realized gains if they are to enforce effectively the provisions of 10b-5. The
importance of actual value is illustrated by the error made by one court
which held that damages should be measured by the difference between price
paid and the market value at the time of the discovery of the fraud. 54 This
measure is open to two immediate criticisms. First, it may include speculative
damages if a long period has elapsed between the fraudulently induced pur-
chase and the discovery of the fraud. Second, if market value exceeds price
paid at the time of the discovery of the 10b-5 violation, no recovery would
be allowed. This latter result may seem logical at first glance, but in certain
situations it abrogates the function of the federal out-of-pocket rule. This
abrogation may be illustrated by the following hypothetical.
Assume defendants, in violation of 10b-5, misrepresent that their Ura-
nium Company has a certain amount of earnings, assets and so on. Relying
53 See Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962); cf. Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125, 129 (1889).
64 Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104-05, (10th Cir. 1968). In this case, if damages
had been measured on the date of sale rather than on the date the fraud was discovered,
plaintiffs would not have been entitled to any damages because the jury found that the
value of the security on the date of purchase was equal to the purchase price.
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on these representations, the plaintiff purchases 100 shares of Uranium Com-
pany stock at $100 per share in the reasonable belief that this is the actual
value of the shares at the time. Besides ambitious goals, defendants have
nothing but a certificate of incorporation, a charter, a board of directors and
officers. Assume further that through some extremely fortuitous circumstances
the defendants make a major uranium discovery soon after plaintiff's purchase.
Later, because of this discovery, defendants are able to acquire assets and
receive $150 per share by going public on the American Stock Exchange.
Plaintiff, who by the exercise of reasonable care could not have discovered
the fraud any earlier, discovers the fraud shortly after the securities are placed
on the exchange and brings an action under 10b-5 relying on the out-of-
pocket rule of damages to reduce his cost basis. Plaintiff has evidence that on
the day of his purchase three other uranium companies in the same position
as defendants could ask only $10 per share for their securities.
Plaintiff would be allowed to recover only if a court were to allow him
to show actual value (by the intrinsic method of valuation) at the date on
which he purchased the stock and only if the court were to disregard market
value on subsequent days. It is doubtful that any court would grant recovery
in this situation even though a violation of 10b-5 occurred, a difference be-
tween actual value and price paid existed, and the defendant profited by a
$90 reduction in cost of capital. The problem is one of basic assumption. As
pointed out earlier, some courts apparently create a presumption that a plain-
tiff-seller would not have sold at all had he known the true facts. A parallel
presumption might exist that plaintiff-buyer would not have purchased at
all had he known the true facts, and thus that the only appropriate remedy
is a return to the status quo through rescission and return of the purchase
price. The facts in many cases (including the above hypothetical) may indi-
cate that plaintiff would have bought the security, albeit at a lower price,
even if the true facts had been known to him. A plaintiff should be allowed
to prove that he would have bought the security even if he had known the
true facts. A contrary rule forces the plaintiff to choose between retention of
his stock despite the fraud surrounding his purchase and return of his stock
as a prerequisite to redressing a wrong done to him.
c. Retention of the Security by Plaintiff. One final problem remains in
the recovery of money damages by a plaintiff-buyer. Because Section 12 of
the Securities Act of 1933 may apply, it is questionable that a buyer may
both hold his securities and sue for money damages. It is likely that Section
12 of the 1933 Act," which concerns material misstatements in prospectuses
or oral communications, may govern some cases that could fall under
1013-5. 56 If this is the case, then the plaintiff-buyer possibly would be limited
by that provision to price paid plus interest upon the tender of the security
to the defendant. 57
55 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964).
56 See Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (ED. Pa. 1948).
57 Cf. id. at 124-25. Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides in part:
to purchaser may sue] to recover the consideration paid for such security with
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There is, however, authority for the proposition that a plaintiff-buyer
may hold the security and proceed under 10b-5. In Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 58 the
court held an action under Section 12 of the 1933 Act was inappropriate
because plaintiff desired to hold the security, but the court allowed an action
under 10b-5. Although the court did not pass on the damages question, it is
submitted that the plaintiff should be allowed to recover the difference be-
tween his purchase price and the actual value on the date of sale. In terms
of the Uranium Company hypothetical, plaintiff should be allowed to hold
the security and reduce his cost basis by the difference between price paid
($100) and actual value at the date of purchase ($10).
C. Conclusions on Remedies of Individuals
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the measure of damages
in lOb-5 actions should be governed by the federal out-of-pocket rule of damages
for both buyer and seller. The determination of actual value is the critical factor
in applying the rule, for actual value can be determined only from the cir-
cumstances of each particular case. In 1Ob-5 actions by sellers, plaintiff
should be required to prove the actual value of that security to the plaintiff
by any reasonable means including appraisal of intrinsic factors or by a
resale value test. Rescission and restitution of the shares to the plaintiff-seller
must be limited to only a few situations where speculative damages will not
be recovered and where the sellers who relied on the misrepresentation are
identifiable. Where the plaintiff-buyer still has the securities, on the other
hand, rescission and restitution should be supplemented by an opportunity to
hold the security and redress the wrong done to him by recovery of money
damages.
This approach is necessary not only to counteract the speculative nature
of the purchase and sale of securities and the consequent problem of specu-
lative damages, but also to provide effective enforcement of Rule 10b-5.
Application of the federal out-of-pocket rule in the manner discussed above
will equalize the remedies and the enforcement of 10b-5 between buyer and
seller.
III. SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTIONS TO PREVENT OR REDRESS THE
PURCHASE OR SALE OF SECURITIES BY THEIR CORPORATION
Plaintiffs, through a derivative suit, may utilize Rule 10b-5 to prevent
or redress actions by their corporation which involve a purchase or sale of
securities. The decision in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp." places important
limitations on actions by shareholders under 106-5 and, indeed, parts of the
opinion create a strong inference that non-selling shareholders have no action
at all under 10b-5. 6° The actual holding in Birnbaum is that Rule 10b-5
was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the
tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
58 223 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
514 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
6° Id. at 463-64.
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practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities
rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and
that Rule X-10b-5 extended protection only to the defrauded pur-
chaser or seller. 01
The line of demarcation between a 10b-.5 violation and fraudulent mismanage-
ment is not always clear. The purpose of this section is to examine some
situations where 10b-5 actions have been allowed and to determine whether
effective remedies are available to meet these situations.
In the examination of remedies where the corporation's activities are
closely tied to the claim for relief, it is helpful to classify the actions in two
sections. The first includes actions to prevent the inception or continuance of
corporate activities or activities by third parties that affect the plaintiff
shareholders' corporation. The second section examines actions for redress
after the transaction or activity has been consummated. Such a distinction
is significant because the substantive requirements for relief and the problem
of remedy application differ between the two.
A. Preventive Relief
The primary remedy sought to prevent corporate security transactions
is the injunction, which may be granted before the transaction begins or while
it is taking place. The leading case for injunctive relief under 10b-5 is Ruckle
v. Rota Am. Corp. 02 In Ruckle, plaintiff, a director of the defendant corpora-
tion, sued derivatively to enjoin an issuance of treasury stock which had been
approved by a majority of the directors. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant
directors of the corporation had, by withholding certain information from the
entire board, induced the majority of the directors to postpone a stockholders'
meeting and to issue the treasury stock. The defendant directors intended
to issue these securities to the president of the company who could then resell
or vote the shares as he saw fit. Plaintiff further alleged that defendants' pur-
pose in withholding this information in violation of 10b-5 was solely to protect
the defendants' ownership rights (from an apparent takeover by plaintiff and
others) and thus the issuance of the stock would harm the corporation.
The court upheld plaintiff's theory that a corporation could be defrauded
by a majority of the directors, that the impending issuance by the corporation
constituted a sale under 10b-5 and that a preliminary injunction should be
issued to enjoin the issuance pending trial on the merits. This reasoning allows
shareholders to bring suit when their corporation is, or is about to become a
seller of securities, even though the individual plaintiff is not a seller. Similar
reasoning would allow shareholders to sue when the corporation is about to
purchase the securities.
Although the Ruckle court does not explicitly mention any test for the
propriety of a preliminary injunction, other courts have required the plaintiff
to satisfy the traditional requirements of equity. The preliminary injunction
is an extraordinary equitable remedy granted on the basis of the courts'
61 Id. at 464.
62 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
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discretion." The plaintiff must show that there is no adequate remedy at law,
for only if compénsatory damages are inadequate will plaintiff be able to
show irreparable harm that justifies invoking equity jurisdiction." The plain-
tiff must also show that there is some likelihood that he can show a lOb-5
violation at a subsequent trial on the merits." Determination of plaintiff's
likelihood of success is particularly within the discretion of the court, but it
is certainly important that the 10b-5 violation be clear from the facts
alleged."
In Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc.," the plaintiff corpora-
tion was denied a preliminary injunction to prevent the corporate defendant's
announcement of a tender offer to purchase plaintiff corporation's shares. The
court denied an injunction because it felt that there was little likelihood
that the plaintiff could establish a material misrepresentation at trial on
the merits. The court noted, moreover, that the plaintiff failed to show that
it would suffer irreparable injury if the tender offer was carried out, since
plaintiff could restrain the voting of the shares after the transfer was com-
pleted."
The decision in Symington illustrates a practical difficulty which plain-
tiffs must face in the attempt to demonstrate irreparable injury. The court
implicitly recognized that tender offers are geared to prevailing market con-
ditions and the current financial status of both companies, and further that
any delay of the tender offer may force renegotiation or termination of the
tender offer because of changing economic conditions. Any such delay would
greatly prejudice the defendant and other stockholders in the plaintiff cor-
poration who wished to take advantage of the tender offer if no violation of
10b-5 were found at a subsequent trial on the merits." However, in its desire
to avoid these problems, the court overlooked the complexity of the remedy
problem if the transaction were allowed to continue and a 10b-5 violation
did in fact occur. Money damages would be inadequate relief because the
merger would have already taken effect and the shift of ownership would be
completed. Although preventing the shares from being voted by a later in-
junction may prevent the takeover, granting restitution if a 10b-5 violation
were found would raise the problem of speculative damages or might even
be impossible if the defendant had resold the shares to a good faith pur-
chaser."
A balance of these equities is found in Puharich v. Borders Electronics
C0.71 The court granted a preliminary injunction requiring that the shares
63 Korn v. Franchard Corp., Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 92,130 at 96,601-02
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1968).
64 See J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1338 (students' ed. 1907).
65 Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Co., 366 F.2d 199, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1966).
66 See Korn v. Franchard Corp., Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ii 92,130 at 96,601-02
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1968).
67 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1967).
68 Id. at 843. See also Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., Cur-
rent CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 92,270 at 97,307 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1968).
69 See authorities cited note 68 supra.
70 But see Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., Current CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 92,270 at 97,307 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1968).
71 Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1f 92,160 (S.DN.Y. Feb. 29, 1968). In Puharich
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already tendered and any shares tendered in the future be kept in escrow.
The court also restrained the defendants from calling any stockholders meet-
ing until a trial on the merits was concluded. The solution reached in Puharich
is correct because it allows the parties to complete the mechanics of the tender
offer, but prevents the shares from being distributed or controlled by the
defendant until a decision on the merits is reached. This result greatly simpli-
fies the task for the court if a lOb-5 violation is subsequently found, for the
court can require the shares to be delivered back to the sellers from escrow
and thereby prevent the management takeover and prevent any problems
arising from resale by the defendants. The defendants also are protected
because the mechanics of the tender offer are allowed to continue, and, if
no 10b-5 violation is found, the shares can be released to the defendants and
the takeover effected.
In sustaining actions for injunctions before the transaction is completed,
therefore, the courts balance irreparable harm threatened plaintiff and his
likelihood of eventual success with the prejudice which the injunction will
cause the defendant. In light of the possible complexity of the remedy prob-
lem after the transaction has occurred, the courts should establish equitable
means for restraining the transaction, for the plaintiff will generally be irrep-
arably injured if his ownership rights are endangered. Thus, the courts should
be liberal in the application of the likelihood-of-success test where preliminary
injunctions are sought to prevent corporate takeovers, but should allow the
mechanics of the transaction to be carried out by ancillary procedures similar
to an escrow agreement. The measure, adequacy and application of money
damages or restitution cause difficult problems in derivative suits. Prophylactic
relief provides the best way to avoid these problems.
B. Redress of Completed Transactions
The discussion of remedies in this section is based almost entirely on
extrapolation, for no reported case has reached a final decision on the damages
question in a derivative action where the transaction has already occurred.
This extrapolation requires application of the concepts of money damages
and restitution developed earlier to cases where special problems arise because
the transaction involving the securities has already occurred. Some of these
problems relate to standing to sue," others relate to a lob-5 violation that is
only a part of a broader scheme of fraudulent mismanagement," and others
relate to providing an adequate remedy. The purpose of this section is to
examine some of the more difficult problems of remedy application in cases
where transactions closely tied to corporate activities have already occurred.
plaintiff alleged misrepresentations in the written agreements between the companies in
violation of 10b-5. The agreement related to an acquisition by the defendant of a con-
trolling interest in the plaintiff's corporation. Plaintiffs further alleged that the takeover
was solely for tax purposes which would result in injury to the corporation and its share-
holders. Puharich v. Borders Electronics Co., Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. IT 92,141
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1968).
72 Comment, The Expanding Uses of Rule 10b-5, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 313
(1968).
73 See Comment, Shareholders' Derivative Suit To Enforce A Corporate Right of
Action Against Directors Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. $78 (1966).
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1. The Intertwining of Corporate Mismanagement.---The intertwining of
10b-5 violations and corporate mismanagement is occasioned by decisions
holding that directors may be liable under 10b-5 if they induce their cor-
poration to issue securities to third parties or to buy from third parties.74
At this point the cases come into the area of mismanagement of corporate
affairs, and the problems of adequate relief become complex. Unfortunately,
none of the cases in the area has yet met the post-transaction remedial prob-
lem head on.
The corporation may, for example, bring an action against former
directors. In New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmerm the plaintiff corporation
brought such an action against three former directors and officers alleging
that the defendants had induced the corporation to purchase properties with
a value far less than that which the defendants had represented by issuing
an excessive number of securities. The complaint also alleged a wrongful
expenditure of cash for certain services. The court allowed the 10b-5 action
despite the fact that the transaction may have involved a larger scheme of
mismanagement and despite the fact that the defendants were apparently not
the only people who had received the shares."
If it is assumed that plaintiffs in New Park were able to prove a violation
of 10b-5, it is obvious that certain complexities would arise in the determina-
tion of the appropriate measure of recovery. Damages in this case would have
to be determined by the federal out-of-pocket rule—the difference between the
value of the shares issued and the value of the properties or consideration
received. But if the securities were not widely traded, the court would be
faced not only with the valuation of the securities given but with the valu-
ation of the properties received by the corporation. In many cases, both would
have to be determined by the intrinsic method of valuation.
New Park raises a second problem concerning the damages allowable
under 10b-5. A strict application of the federal out-of-pocket rule would
allow recovery for cash outlays only if they are related to the transfer of the
securities.77 The broader the scope of the fraudulent mismanagement, the
more difficult it becomes to determine which damages result from the 10b-5
violation in the transfer of the securities and which result from breaches of
fiduciary duty. It is submitted that a court should resolve all the questions
involved in the particular case where a 10b-5 violation has occurred, even
though litigation concerning breach of fiduciary duty alone is not actionable
under 10b-5.78
2. Double Recovery.—Aside from the problem of the intertwining of 10b-5
violations and breaches of fiduciary duty which pervades most derivative
actions against directors where a transfer of securities is involved, there are
certain cases where a derivative action is improper even where a 10b-5
74 See Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) ; cf. Heit v. Weitzen,
Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 92,279 at 97,338 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 1968).
75 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.DN.Y. 1963).
70 Id. at 266.
77 See Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962).
78 See O'Neil v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 767-68 (2d Cir. 1964).
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violation is proved. A derivative action is improper when it would result in
double recovery or would prevent those persons who were actually injured
from being compensated." The problem of double recovery is well illustrated
by Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc. 80 In Mutual Shares, plaintiffs were
minority shareholders in Kress Corporation and alleged that the defendant,
Genesco, had made fraudulent representations to Kress shareholders to effect
a tender offer. Plaintiffs were apparently not shareholders of Kress at the time
of the tender offer and consequently were not members of the class to which
the offer was directed, nor did they sell their shares. Plaintiffs alleged further
that since the termination of the tender offer the defendant had manipulated
the market price of Kress shares downward to force the remaining shareholders
to sell.
The court sustained an injunction to prevent the continuance of the
market manipulation,81
 but would not sustain an action by plaintiffs indi-
vidually or derivatively for the corporation's benefit as a result of the allegedly
fraudulent tender offer. The court reasoned that, because the plaintiffs had
not sold as a result of the allegedly fraudulent tender offer, they would be
unable to prove that they had been induced by fraud to sell or that they had
suffered any loss."
This result reflects the proper interpretation of lob-S in outside tender
offer situations. The relief for non-selling shareholders should be limited to
protection from market manipulation because until they do sell they receive
no injury.83
 In the same sense, a derivative suit for damages is inappropriate
because there is only a potential for injury to the corporation if the new
owners breach their fiduciary duties. The selling shareholders, therefore, are
the only parties injured within the contemplation of 10b-5. To allow a deriva-
tive suit by non-sellers would result in double recovery if the injured parties,
the sellers, were allowed an action. 84 The problem of double recovery will
arise in any case where the corporation itself was not the buyer or seller.
79 But see Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct.
1968). In a common law derivative suit for breach of fiduciary duty, the corporation was
allowed recovery of damages where the defendant directors had sold their securities on the
basis of inside information that the company's earnings were going to drop. Allowing
recovery by the corporation in this situation prevents recovery by the persons buying
those shares, the persons actually injured, or results in double recovery if a subsequent
action by the buyers is allowed against the defendants. The payment of damages to the
corporation is improper because the corporation suffered no injury by the defendants'
sale of stock. The only injury to the corporation was the decline in earnings.
The only justification for this result is that the corporation may eventually be liable
for the misrepresentations of its directors or officers. There was no indication in Diamond
that any potential corporate liability existed.
80 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
81 Id. at 546-47 where the court reasoned that plaintiffs, because they were injured
by the activity, had the same power as the SEC to prevent manipulation.
82 Id. at 546.
83 But see Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), where plaintiff
who had not yet sold was allowed to bring a 10b-5 action because his corporation had
merged into another by a "short-form" merger agreement. This merger would soon
force the plaintiff either to sell or exchange his stock.
84 See Defiance Indus., Inc. v. Galdi, 256 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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The appropriate action where a tender offer by an outsider has been
completed would be a class action by all sellers subscribing to the tender
offer and seeking rescission of the transaction along with restitution as gov-
erned by the limitations discussed earlier." On the other hand, sellers could
be given money damages measured by the out of pocket rule if a great deal
of time had elapsed or if their only objection was the deflated value at which
they had been induced to sell. if some sellers wanted restitution while others
wanted money damages, the court could rely on the test of a reasonable in-
vestor under all the circumstances to determine which remedy is proper for
the class. The court could, if it were feasible under the circumstances of the
case, give either remedy according to the desire of each individual plaintiff.
3. The Corporation as a Buyer or Seller.—A shareholder may bring a deriva-
tive action for damages to the corporation if the corporation was induced by
a 10b-5 violation to issue or purchase its own securities or to purchase other
securities. Such cases avoid the problem of double recovery encountered in
outside tender offer situations as in Mutual Shares above. The corporation
itself in the situations discussed hereafter is the purchaser or seller of secur-
ities and is thus the party who suffers injury.
One of the few cases that has considered the damages question in a
derivative suit is Pappas v. Moss. 86 In that case a derivative action was
brought by several minority stockholders who alleged that all the directors
had defrauded the corporation by issuing unregistered securities to them-
selves at an unreasonable discount price. The district court found a violation
of 10b-5 because the defendants' conduct was made illegal under Rule
10b-697 and because that Rule should be incorporated into 10b-5." Without
explaining its basis for measuring the reasonableness of the discount," the
court found that 20 percent of market price was a reasonable discount. It
then assessed damages against each director equivalent to the difference
between 80 percent of market value on the date of the various purchases
and the price which they had actually paid. 9°
On appeal, however, the circuit court reversed. It disagreed with the
district court's interpretation of 10b-5 and remanded the case to the district
court for resolution of all relevant questions including damages. The appellate
court did not settle the damage issue but noted that the district court had
not explained its measurement of a reasonable discount. The circuit court
questioned the use of market value and indicated that the "fair value" of
the stock at the "critical dates" was the relevant factor "in resolving several
issues."9 ' It is submitted that, if a 10b-5 violation is found on remand in
Pappas, the corporation is a defrauded seller and should be allowed the same
85 For a discussion of the use of the class action device, see A. Bromberg, Securities
Law: Fraud—SEC Rule 1013-5 § 11.6 (1968).
86 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968), rev'ing 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966).
87 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-6 (1968).
88 Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345, 364 & n.6 (D.N.J. 1966).
89 Discount prices are commonly utilized to provide incentives for management to
take a proprietary interest in the corporation.
99 Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345, 364 (D.N.J. 1966).
91 Pappas V. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 870 (3d Cir. 1968).
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recovery applicable to individual sellers. Damages should be measured by
the difference between actual value and selling price received. The only
logical method of determining actual value in Pappas is to calculate the
reasonable discount from market price on the date of the decision and to em-
ploy that figure as actual value. As an alternative remedy, the corporation
should be able to rescind the transaction and have the shares returned if the cir-
cumstances require.
4. Money Damages or Restitution.—In the foregoing cases in this section, the
basic remedy discussed is money damages. In many derivative actions, how-
ever, the actual concern of the plaintiff is the change in ownership which results
when his corporation issues or purchases its own shares. For example, the
increased ownership achieved by the defendants, not their financial enrich-
ment, may have been the actual concern of the plaintiffs in Pappas. The
more difficult cases of changes in ownership arise in acquisitions, mergers or
consolidations. In Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 92 the court
allowed a derivative action under 10b-5 in which plaintiff alleged that, be-
cause certain directors falsified reports and proxy statements, the shareholders
approved the issuance of securities with a value $2,000,000 higher than the
value of the corporations acquired. It should be noted that as a result of the
transfer, one director's ownership increased from 33 percent to 76 percent."
Although the question of damages was never reached, money damages would
merely force the defendants who took part in the fraud to pay an equitable
price for the shares. Plaintiffs' actual concern was that the ownership and con-
trol acquired by the defendant be nullified by rescission of the transaction
and return of the shares. Rescission and restitution would avoid the problems
of valuation which arise if money damages are sought and would prevent the
change in ownership. In most cases, therefore, rescission and restitution would
afford a more satisfactory remedy to the plaintiffs and would be easier for the
court to apply than would money damages. There are, however, certain prob-
lems with restitution. One is the speculative damages problem discussed earlier
which arises if a great deal of time elapses between the transaction and the
court's decision. The second problem is that in mergers by stock acquisitions
not all the shares go to the defendants. Even if the defendant directors are on
the boards of both companies involved in the transaction, it is questionable
whether the entire transaction is voidable so as to allow restitution of the
shares from those who have no notice of the fraud or misrepresentation.° 4
However, plaintiffs could argue that the plaintiff corporation had issued shares
as a result of the fraud of the other corporation, for the knowledge of the direc-
tors' guilt of the 10b-5 violation is imputed to the other directors and thus to
the entire corporation. If this argument could be supported, then rescission
and restitution would be proper because the shareholders of the fraudulent
corporation acted as an entity, not as individuals.
The more difficult situation arises where the defendant directors were not
directors in the other corporation in the acquisition but simply substantial
02 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966).
93 This director was not a named defendant because of improper venue.
94 See Restatement of Restitution § I67(c), illustration 3 (1936).
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shareholders who would benefit from the transfer.° 5 Here, if a lob-5 violation
is established, plaintiff should be able to require restitution from the defend-
ant as the circumstances of the particular case allow. Plaintiff would have
two arguments to void the entire transaction. One argument would be that
the directors of the other corporation knew or should have known that the
terms of the transfer were a result of misinformation and that thereby the
other corporation became a party to the fraud. The second argument would
be a constructive trust theory that the shareholders should not be allowed
unjust enrichment as a result of the defendants' fraud." The success of both
of these arguments is questionable. Furthermore, the numerous resales that
would occur if the security is widely traded make it even more questionable
that effective restitution of all the shares could ever be accomplished in these
cases. Thus, where an action is brought against directors when they are the
only wrongdoing participants in the transaction, it is likely that recovery
could come only from them.
IX. CONCLUSION
Because of the widening variety of conduct proscribed by Rule 10b-5,
it is important to restrict damages under the Rule to the federal out-of-pocket
rule of damages. Money damages in both individual and derivative actions
should be limited to the difference between actual value to the plaintiff at the
date of sale and the price paid or received. Actual value cannot be measured
at some arbitrary time or by some arbitrary standard, but must be measured
in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case for a determination
of plaintiff's actual damages as a result of the 10b-5 violation.
For the purposes of limiting speculative damages and of compensating
plaintiff for his actual damages, restitution of the securities should be con-
sidered an extraordinary remedy not to be employed unless there is a clear
showing that it is appropriate under the circumstances.
For avoidance of the complexities of damage recovery under 10b-5, the
prophalyctic remedial structure under the Rule must be expanded. Injunctive
relief can avoid the possible inadequacies and inconsistencies now hindering
effective enforcement of the Rule. Injunctive relief avoids the unrealistic
measurement of money damages and the uneven application of rescission and
restitution. The proper use of injunctive relief could free those remedies for
their own appropriate use.
KURT M. SWENSON
95 See Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where the court held that
there was no action under 106-5. Plaintiffs alleged that in competition with their own
corporation the defendant directors were purchasing shares of another corporation.
96 See Restatement of Restitution § 167 (1936).
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